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   The Value of Communication Practices for Comparative Law:  





Abstract: This article explores the relationship between the Scottish and the English legal 
traditions through the lens of communication practices. ‘Communication practices’ are 
conceived of as the multiple ways in which legal traditions interact with one another by a 
combination of the circulation of legal ideas and the activities of legal actors. The article argues 
that greater attention should be paid in comparative legal literature to communication practices 
as they evolve over time and space, being especially mindful of the language used and the 
labels employed. By exploring different shapes of temporality and space, this article 
demonstrates the importance of looking beyond both discrete events and moments of 
transplantation, and the immediate geographical space. It also shows that the focus on language 
and what is explicitly said, but also on what is not said, generates insights both into the various 
techniques and practices involved in communication, as well as the factors that play a role. By 
examining concrete examples of communication involving both judges and legislatures, drawn 
from across different areas of law and different time periods, this article argues that contrary 
to the prevailing narrative, communication practices between Scotland and England are much 
richer and more dynamic than we tend to assume. Ultimately, the article questions the narrative 
and construction of the Scottish legal tradition, and of mixed legal systems more generally, as 
systems that primarily adopt ideas from abroad, rather than generating ideas capable of 
stimulating and shaping developments elsewhere. 
 
1. Introduction: Challenging Prevailing Perspectives and Narratives 
 
Comparative lawyers have long been fascinated with the study of how legal ideas circulate 
across jurisdictions and legal traditions.1 As is well known, in some cases, this circulation has 
led to the creation of ‘mixed legal systems’,2 which include Scotland, for it displays a mixture 
between Civil law and English common law. Mixed legal systems therefore offer a fertile 
ground of investigation in this field and have attracted increasing attention in recent years.3 
However, it would appear that the use of the label ‘mixed legal system’ has led legal scholars 
 
* Lord President Reid Professor of Law, University of Edinburgh. I would like to thank Ross Anderson, John 
Blackie, John Cairns, George Gretton, Alasdair Peterson, Elspeth Reid, Kenneth Reid, Ruth Sefton-Green, and 
Neil Walker for their helpful suggestions and comments. I would also like to thank those who attended the lecture 
for their stimulating questions and comments and, in particular, Lord Mance for chairing the lecture. 
1 It was a Scottish legal scholar, the late Alan Watson, who singled out the theme as a major subject for 
comparative legal studies. See A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1974). For an 
overview of the debate and literature in the field, see especially M Graziadei, ‘Comparative Law as the Study of 
Transplants and Receptions’, in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2019) 443. 
2 The literature on the topic is rich. For an overview of the various conflicting views on the meaning of ‘mixed 
legal systems’ and on what counts as such see, especially, J du Plessis, ‘Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed 
Legal Systems’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2nd edn, 
OUP 2019) 474; VV Palmer, ‘Mixed Legal Systems’ in M Bussani and U Mattei (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to Comparative Law (CUP 2012) 368; E Örücü, ‘Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual Search’, 
in E Örücü, E Attwooll and S Coyle (eds), Studies in Legal Systems: Mixed and Mixing (Kluwer Law International 
1996) 333.  
3 KGC Reid, ‘The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems’ (2003) 78 Tulane Law Review 5, 16.  
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to direct their attention primarily to the origins of the law in such systems. In other words, the 
emphasis in comparative legal literature has often been placed on what mixed legal systems 
have ‘imported’ from other legal traditions.4 This, I argue, has obscured other important 
features of mixed legal systems and, especially, their relationship with other legal traditions.  
As far as Scotland in particular is concerned, it is noticeable that much of the scholarly 
debate has centred on whether it has created an optimal mix5 by picking the best solutions 
available in other jurisdictions, or whether the fact that Scotland has taken ideas from other 
jurisdictions is actually a sign of weakness.6 Either way, the prevailing narrative in the literature 
has been one in which Scots law and its legal actors, rather than generating ideas that circulate 
abroad, have taken ideas and inspiration from, or have been subjected to the influence of, other 
legal traditions. Whilst there are numerous studies that have explored the reception of Roman 
and Civil law in Scotland,7 and especially English law,8 comparatively little appears to have 
been written about the extent to which Scots law has shaped developments elsewhere,9 
including south of the border. Even though some authors have pointed to institutional factors 
that have allowed Scots law to influence developments in England, such as the 
 
4 See JW Cairns, ‘National, Transnational and European Legal Histories: Problems and Paradigms. A Scottish 
Perspective’ (2012) 5 Clio@Thémis: Revue electronique d’historie du droit 1, 12-13.  
5 Lord Cooper, ‘The Scottish Legal Tradition’ reported in the Scottish Legal Tradition, The Saltire Society and 
the Stair Society (1991) 65, 68 and TB Smith in the works cited below at Fn 8. The debate is referred to by WA 
Wilson, ‘Knowing the Law and Other Things’ [1982] Juridical Review 259, 271. The notion of the genius of 
Scots law is however contested by R Evans-Jones, ‘Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of 
the Genius of Scots Private Law’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review  228 ff; R Evans-Jones, ‘Mixed Legal 
Systems, Scotland and the Unification of Private Law in Europe’, in JM Smits (ed), The Contribution of Mixed 
Legal Systems to European Private Law (Intersentia 2001) 39, 44. A Rodger, ‘Thinking about Scots Law’ (1996) 
Edinburgh Law Review 1, 3; L Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order: Crime and the Genius of Scots 
Law 1747 to the Present (Cambridge 1997); L Farmer, ‘Debatable Land: An Essay on the Relationship between 
English and Scottish Criminal Law’ (1999) Edinburgh Law Review 32, 33; L Farmer, ‘The Genius of Our Law...’: 
Criminal Law and the Scottish Legal Tradition’ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 25 ff; JM Thomson, ‘Legal change 
and Scots private law’, in JW Cairns and O Robinson (eds), Critical Studies in Ancient Law. Comparative Law 
and Legal History: Essays in Honour of Alan Watson (Oxford 2001) 379. On possible meanings of the word 
‘genius’, see HL MacQueen, ‘Scots and English Law: The Case of Contract’ (2001) Current Legal Problems 205, 
212.  
6 See especially Evans-Jones, ‘Receptions of Law’ (n 5) 228 ff.  
7 See, for example, P Stein, Roman Law in Scotland (1968); WM Gordon, ‘The Civil Law in Scotland’ (2010) 
Edinburgh Law Review 130; JW Cairns, ‘Historical Introduction’ in KGC Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A 
History of Private Law in Scotland, vol 1 (OUP 2000) 14. 
8 Some authors have therefore spoken of an ‘Anglicisation’ of Scots law especially in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
TB Smith ‘English Influences on the Law of Scotland’ (1954) 3 American Journal of Comparative Law 522, 540; 
TB Smith ‘The Common Law Cuckoo’ (1956) Butterworths South African Law Review 147; TB Smith, British 
Justice: The Scottish Contribution (London 1961) 85. See also AD Gibb, Law from over the Border. A short 
Account of a Strange Jurisdiction (1950); AD Gibb, ‘The inter-relation of the legal systems of Scotland and 
England’ (1937) 53 Law Quarterly Review 61; GC Hutchison, ‘Anglo-Scottish Political Relations in the 
Nineteenth Century, c. 1815-1914’ in Smout (ed), Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603-1900 (OUP 2005) 247, 
252-3. The term is also employed by PH Brodie, ‘From Scotland and Ireland. (a) Scotland after 1704’ in L Blom-
Cooper, B Dickson and G Drewry (eds), The Judicial House of Lords 1876-2009 (Oxford 2009) 279, 289-294 
and by A Paterson, Final Judgment. The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing 2013) 225.  
9 Exceptions are authors cited in fnn (n 12-13) below as well as Lord Denning, Borrowing from Scotland, 26th 
David Murray Lecture (Glasgow 1963); Lady Hale, ‘The Contribution of Scottish Cases to Developing United 
Kingdom Law’, Law Society of Scotland Annual Conference 2018. Some scholars have examined the influence 
of Scottish legal ideas in the US: RH Helmholz, ‘Scots Law in the New World: Its Place in the Formative Era of 
American Law’ in HL MacQueen (ed), Stair Miscellany V (Stair Society vol 52, 2006) 169 who reaches rather 
different conclusions from CP Rogers, ‘Scots Law in Post-Revolutionary and Nineteenth-Century America: The 
Neglected Jurisprudence’ (1990) 8 Law & History Review 205. See further W Ewald, ‘James Wilson and the 
Scottish Enlightenment’ (2010) 12 Journal of Constitutional Law 1053, 1106 ff; JE Pfander and DD Birk, ‘Article 
III and the Scottish Judiciary’ (2011) 124 Harvard Law Review 1613; A Rahmatian, Lord Kames: Legal and 
Social Theorist (EUP 2016) ch XI. 
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disproportionately high number of Scottish appeals to the House of Lords between 1740 and 
1875,10 and the convention, established later, of there being two Scots among the Lords of 
Appeal in Ordinary,11 they do not usually engage in a case study. Only a few scholars have 
investigated examples where Scottish legal ideas have circulated south of the border,12 
including cases where Scots law has operated as a channel for Roman or natural law ideas.13 
As a consequence, the relationship between Scotland and England has been explored mostly 
from one particular angle, namely the extent to which, and the ways in which, English law has 
influenced, or encroached upon, Scots law.14 
The purpose of this article is to offer a different perspective on the relationship between 
Scotland and England. More specifically, its aim is to explore various dimensions of this 
relationship through the lens of communication practices.15 By ‘communication practices’ I 
mean the multiple ways in which legal traditions interact with one another by a combination 
of the circulation of legal ideas and the activities of legal actors.16 The paper seeks to apply the 
concept of communication practices to the relationship between the Scottish and the English 
legal traditions, but also to reflect on what comparative law can learn from this particular 
exercise, including for the study of how legal ideas circulate as well as for its approach to 
mixed legal systems more generally.  
The article argues that contrary to the prevailing narrative, communication practices 
between Scotland and England are much richer and more dynamic than we tend to assume. 
This is so in areas and ways that are not necessarily always apparent, and in which a multitude 
of players both north and south of the border play a role. The article further claims that in order 
to appreciate the dimensions and dynamics of communication practices, as well as the quality 
of the multiple layers of interaction between legal traditions, it is important to look beyond 
 
10 In the early 19th century the number of appeals reached 80% and then dropped to 10% at the end of the 19th 
century. On the number of appeals, see Paterson, Final Judgment (n 8) 232-234; L Blom-Cooper and G Drewry, 
Final Appeal (Clarendon 1972) 31 ff; J Finlay, ‘Scots lawyers and the House of Lords Appeals in Eighteen-
Century Britain’ (2011) 32 Legal History 249, and, more recently, P Loft, ‘Litigation, the Anglo-Scottish Union, 
and the House of Lords as the High Court, 1660-1875’ (2017) The Historical Journal 1.  
11 The Convention has been in place since 1932 and has carried on with the Supreme Court even though the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 only requires that there should be at least one Justice with knowledge and 
experience of the law and practice in each part of the United Kingdom. Alan Paterson has pointed out that 
influence did not come merely from numbers but also the length of service of Scottish judges: A Paterson, 
‘Scottish Lords of Appeal, 1876-1988’ [1988] Juridical Review 235, 250. In addition, Scotsmen had an influence 
in their position as Lord Chancellors, who often did the judicial work of the HL, and as members of the Privy 
Council.  
12 For detailed studies see JA Dieckmann, ‘Scots Influence on English Law: The Guarantor’s Right to Derivative 
Recourse (Subrogation)’ (2004) 8 Edinburgh Law Review 329; Evans-Jones, ‘Receptions of Law’ (n 5); R Evans-
Jones, ‘Roman law in Scotland and England and the development of one law for Britain’ (1999) 115 Law 
Quarterly Review 605.  
13 D Ibbetson, ‘Common Law Evolution: The Influence of Mixed Legal Systems’, in HL MacQueen (ed), Stair 
Miscellany VI (The Stair Society vol 54, 2009) 267, 276.  
14 To the point that some have even spoken of a ‘Scottification’ especially at certain times in history, Paterson, 
‘Scottish Lords of Appeal’ (n 11) 246; Paterson, Final Judgment (n 8) 231. See also Lady Hale, ‘The Contribution 
of Scottish Cases’ (n 9) 7. 
15 That law can be studied as communication is not a new suggestion. See especially M van Hoecke, Law as 
Communication (Hart Publishing, 2002) and D Nelken (ed), Law as Communication. Issues in Law & Society 
(Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd 1996).  
16 In my previous work I have focused on the communication between academics and judges. See A Braun, 
‘Judges and Academics: Features of a Partnership’ in J Lee (ed), From House of Lords to Supreme Court. Judges, 
Jurists and the Process of Judging (Hart Publishing 2010) 227 and Giudici e Accademia nell’esperienza inglese. 
Storia di un dialogo (Mulino 2006). That the circulation of ideas depends on people is stressed by J Bell, ‘The 
Relevance of Foreign Examples to Legal Development’ (2001) 21 Duke Journal of Comparative & International 
Law 431, 443. 
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both discrete events,17 and the immediate geographical space. Indeed, it is submitted that 
greater attention should be paid in comparative legal literature to communication practices as 
they evolve both over time and space.18 We can then appreciate that circulation takes different 
forms and shapes, often involving a number of successive events that are interconnected, and 
that legal change is a subtle interactive phenomenon.  
It is further submitted that, when investigating communication practices, we should be 
especially mindful of the language employed, whilst also being prepared to look beyond it. 
This, I argue, will allow us to obtain insight not only into the various techniques and practices 
involved in communication, but also the role and relevance (or not) of certain causal factors, 
i.e. factors that drive or facilitate circulation. We can then also see what is specific to the 
relationship between Scotland and England.  
I should premise that my analysis will not engage with the question of which influence is 
greater, the English or the Scottish, or of whether such influence is even desirable. Indeed, I 
should mention from the outset that I do not approach this subject in any narrowly nationalistic 
spirit. Further, this is not a study concerning convergences or divergences between English and 
Scots law. Rather, this article is intended to shed light on aspects of the relationship between 
Scots and English law hitherto often neglected and to articulate the significance of these aspects 
for the comparative study of law more generally.  
The article explores a selective set of concrete examples of circulation19 of Scottish legal 
ideas. I take the term ‘legal ideas’ to include rules and legal doctrines but also legal reasoning, 
coming from Scotland. Some of the examples are recent and others more remote and are drawn 
from a range of different areas of the law. Although communication can occur in different 
ways, including through legal education, legal scholarship, and law reform bodies,20 in this 
article, I will focus primarily on judicial or legislative processes.  
The article is divided into two parts that explore two vital dimensions of communication 
practices. The first part deals with the spatio-temporal dimension, where I examine various 
shapes of temporality and explore the added value of paying attention to the spatial dimension. 
The second part looks at the language employed by judges, and what it reveals about what they 
are doing but also what they say they are doing, and thus the techniques they can resort to, 




17 Here see also W Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’ (2004) 36 The Journal of Legal Pluralism 
and Unofficial Law 1, 34.  
18 On this point, see also M Cohn ‘Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and 
Proportionality Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom’ (2010) 58 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 583, 597. 
19 In this article, I deliberately make use of the term ‘circulation’ rather than other terms that have dominated the 
comparative legal discourse, such as ‘legal transplants’, ‘legal transfers’, ‘legal transposition’, ‘diffusion’ or ‘legal 
borrowing’. Circulation is, in my view, a much more dynamic concept, that suggests and reflects the constant 
flow of ideas in all directions. Circulation is capable of capturing a wide range of communicative practices, 
including cases where the ideas move both ways or come full circle, whilst avoiding any assumptions about the 
reasons that lie behind such circulation, or about who has initiated it. It is further helpful because it does not 
suggest that the idea sticks. For a discussion of the meaning of ‘circulation’, see S Gänger, ‘Circulation: reflections 
on circularity, entity, and liquidity in the language of global history’ (2017) Journal of Global History 303. On 
the terminology in this context, see further Graziadei (n 1) as well as D Nelken, ‘Comparatists and transferability’, 
in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (CUP 2003) 437, 463-
4. 
20 For examples of projects of the Law Commission of England and Wales that have adopted solutions found in 
Scots law, see S Wilson Stark, The Work of the British Law Commissions: Law Reform... Now? (Hart Publishing 
2017) 224 ff. 
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2. Paying Attention to the Spatio-Temporal Dimensions of Communication 
Practices 
 
A. Exploring Communication Practices over Time 
 
The first dimension of communication practices I would like to explore is the temporal one. 
What I am trying to show is that to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between 
legal traditions, in our case Scotland and England, we should study communication practices 
as they unfold across time, sometimes long stretches of time. This might enable us to see, for 
instance, the varying degrees of influence of one tradition over another. But this is not my 
focus. Rather, in this paper, I argue that the temporal aspect allows us to also see that the 
circulation is frequently sequential and incremental, and that the adoption is often phased or 
deferred. In other words, more than one event is often required before an idea can gain a 
foothold. We should not therefore limit our attention solely to the moment at which the idea is 
either adopted or rejected. Also, one event may lead to another. Thus, the communication is an 
ongoing one that often involves various steps, which may, but do not have to, accumulate in 
an incremental way, or lead to further circulations. This is not just the case where a legal idea 
is embraced by the courts, but also when legislatures are involved.21  
A good example of where the circulation was sequential and the adoption deferred, in this 
case because there was resistance at first, is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 22 I will only 
mention it very briefly, as it is commonly acknowledged that the doctrine emerged in Scots 
law and later circulated south of the border and then beyond. Indeed, it has been described as 
‘Scotland’s most significant legal export in the field of private international law, influencing 
the development of similar doctrines across the common law world.’23 However, what is 
critical here is that this did not happen from one day to the other. It required three appeals (none 
of which were Scottish) to the House of Lords across a period of thirteen years, beginning in 
1974,24 and ending in 1987,25 before the doctrine was adopted in England. As Lord Bingham 
has pointed out: 
 
Eventually, as we know—in no small part due to the work of Lord Goff, both as advocate and 
judge, and the wisdom of Lord Diplock—the Scottish rule was adopted in England. But it took 
three appeals to the House of Lords to put the law where, one feels, it should always have been 
and might have been had English lawyers of the time been willing to look north of the border and 
acknowledge that acceptance of jurisdiction by the English court is not necessarily an unmixed 
blessing for all concerned.26  
 
By looking not only at the 1987 House of Lords decision in Spiliada Maritime, but also at 
prior case law, we gain a clearer picture of who played a role in the process but also of how 
and why the adoption was delayed. In fact, the decision to embrace the Scottish doctrine is 
 
21 Another good example is the Scottish Bankruptcy legislation which influenced legislation south of the border 
at different stages. For details, see VM Lester, Victorian Insolvency: Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt, and 
Company Winding-up in Nineteenth-Century England (OUP, 1995) 11 and especially 149 ff.   
22 The history of the doctrine is relayed in AE Anton, Private International Law (SULI 1967) 148-154. 
23 A Arzandeh, ‘The origins of the Scottish forum non conveniens’ (2017) 13 Journal of Private International Law 
130, 131. 
24 In The Atlantic Star, Atlantic Star (Owners) Appellants v Bona Spes (Owner) Respondent [1974] AC 436 (HL) 
the House of Lords were invited to abandon the doctrine that proceedings in England could only be taken in 
another country if the former were oppressive. Ten years later, in The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398, 411 (HL) the 
House of Lords moved some way towards the acceptance of the Scottish doctrine. 
25 Spiliada Maritime Corporations v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (HL). 
26 TH Bingham, ‘“There Is a World Elsewhere”: The Changing Perspectives of English Law’ (1992) 41 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 513, 517.  
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likely to have been possible only because of the previous appeals, which were in a sense 
preparatory, and thus part of the same process. 
Another fascinating, though less well known, example of an instance in which the 
circulation of ideas from Scotland was sequential, and the adoption phased, is the area of 
declaratory orders.27 One circulation was followed by another, with the first one inviting or at 
least facilitating the next one.28 As is well known, declaratory orders count as preventive reliefs 
the purpose of which is to afford security and relief against uncertainty or doubt. Although the 
historic roots of the Scottish declarator seem to lie in 14th and 15th century French law,29 there 
is no doubt that Scots law provided the model for legislation south of the border.30 But the 
Scottish influence did not stop there. It is thus useful to distinguish two stages, each involving 
various steps and events, and over a prolonged period of time. The first one began in 182831 
when Lord Brougham started advocating in support of the introduction of the Scottish 
declaratory action in England. The second stage commenced with Lord Dunedin’s seminal 
judgment in an English appeal to the House of Lords, decided in 1921.32  
Let me start from the beginning. Others have shown that although various Lord Chancellors 
including Lord Thurlow, Lord Loughborough and Lord Eldon, had supported the legal change, 
England owes the ‘declaratory action to the agitation of Lord Brougham.’33 In particular, from 
1843 onwards, Lord Brougham, who as is well known had studied law at Edinburgh and who 
had begun his professional life as a Scottish advocate, had introduced a series of bills that were 
modelled on the Scottish declarator action. The process went through various stages, including 
the passing of the Chancery Act 1850, an amendment to the Chancery Procedure Act of 1852, 
and the introduction of the Legitimacy Declaration Act 1858, ultimately resulting in the 1883 
Rules of the Supreme Court. The rules gave English courts a general power to give declaratory 
judgments, but they were enacted at a time when Lord Brougham had already passed away. 34 
In other words, it took 40 years from the first bill, and more than one attempt, before declaratory 
actions were fully available in England.  
But the circulation of Scottish legal ideas in this area of the law did not stop there. The 
second stage at which ideas entered south of the border commenced with the House of Lords 
decision in Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade, dating 
back to 1921.35 Two questions were raised in Russian Commercial, but only one concerns us 
here, namely, how the court should exercise any jurisdiction to give a declaratory order granted 
 
27 Another good example is the law of guarantees. Here see Dieckmann (n 12), who shows that Scottish legal 
ideas were drawn upon at two different stages in the 19th century: at first, through the silent borrowing of Lord 
Kames’ ideas through case law, and then through a legislative intervention, in this case through the Mercantile 
Law Amendment Act 1856, section 5, that was manifestly and openly aimed at assimilating the law on both sides 
of the border.  
28 Cohn (n 18) 598 has argued that legal transplants are not ‘solitary events’.  
29 See EM Borchard, ‘The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform’ (1918) 28 Yale Law Journal 1, 
16. See also his book Declaratory Judgments (2nd edn, 1941). What is interesting is that by the time it entered 
Scotland, the action had fallen into disuse in France.  
30 That Scots law had such an action in place was widely known south of the border. See Curtis v Sheffield (1882) 
21 Ch D 1, 4, per Jessel MR. 
31 On 7 February 1828 Lord Brougham gave his famous speech on the ‘State of the Courts of Common Law’ to 
the House of Commons, in which he praised the Scotch declarator. HC Deb, 7 February 1828, vol 18, cols 127, 
179. On Lord Brougham’s influence see, especially, RS, ‘The Scotch Action of Declarator’ (1849) The Law 
Magazine 173. 
32 Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade [1921] 2 AC 438 (HL). 
33 Borchard (n 29) 25. See Lord Brougham in Earl of Mansfield v Stewart (1846) 5 Bell 139, 160. 
34 For more details about the historical developments, see Borchard (n 29) 25-28; ER Sunderland, ‘A Modern 
Evolution in Remedial Rights – the Declaratory Judgment’ (1907) 16 Michigan Law Review 69, and Lord Woolf 
and J Woolf, The Declaratory Judgment (Sweet & Maxwell 2011) chapter 2. 
35 Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade (n 32). 
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under the 1883 Rules. Again, the answer came from north of the border, though it was not 
immediately adopted.  
Russian Commercial was an English case and the only Scottish judge involved was Lord 
Dunedin,36 who was also the only one referring to Scots law. What is more, he seems to have 
referred to Scots law of his own accord, without counsel of either party mentioning it. In 
deciding whether the High Court Chancery Division can grant a declaratory order, Lord 
Dunedin discussed the general principles of Scots law and suggested that these principles are 
instructive for English lawyers. Quoting his Lordship:  
 
My Lords, I confess that to my mind such expressions give little guidance. It may be that I am 
swayed by my experience of another system of law, but a rule which can be expressed in the 
form of a principle may well be proper to any legal system. Your Lordships are aware that the 
action of declarator has existed for hundreds of years in Scotland. It was praised, with envy, by 
Lord Brougham, in your Lordships' House, in the case of Earl of Mansfield v. Stewart long before 
the genesis of Order XXV. r. 5. The rules that have been elucidated by a long course of decisions 
in the Scottish Courts may be summarized thus: The question must be a real and not a theoretical 
question; the person raising it must have a real interest to raise it; he must be able to secure a 
proper contradictor, that is to say, some one presently existing who has a true interest to oppose 
the declaration sought.37  
 
It is noteworthy that (one exception aside), Lord Dunedin did not cite the long line of 
Scottish cases he was alluding to in the quote, but simply referred to general principles which 
he drew from Scots law. More significantly, a little later, his Lordship added: 
 
I can scarcely lay down myself in this House rules for exercise of discretion by the English Courts 
when such discretion has not hitherto been administered so far as I can see by any rules. I can 
only hope that my remarks will be taken as obiter dicta and that when the occasion next arises 
they will be considered on their merits.38  
 
The passage shows clearly that Lord Dunedin hoped that his remarks on Scots law would 
be taken up in future English cases. In other words, what his Lordship was doing is purposefully 
planting a seed,39 and arguably he did so quite successfully. Indeed, Lord Dunedin’s obiter 
dictum became influential in setting out that a declaratory action is only appropriate if a proper 
contradictor is in place, exercising considerable impact in all kinds of contexts.  
Although Scots law was not determinative of the conclusion reached by the House of Lords 
in Russian Commercial, Lord Dunedin’s proposed tests were picked up 36 years later, in Vine 
Appellant v National Dock Labour Board in 1957.40 Russian Commercial was cited by counsel 
for the appellant but only for the purpose of arguing that declarations should be granted 
cautiously and sparingly.41 Viscount Kilmuir LC, the only judge referring to Russian 
Commercial, first mentioned and agreed with Lord Finlay’s dissenting opinion, whereby the 
 
36 Lord Dunedin was appointed to the House of Lords in 1913 (and served until 1932), after having been President 
of the Court of Session for eight years. R Stevens, Law and Politics. The House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800-
1976 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1979) 269 describes Lord Dunedin as being ‘Not above improving English law 
by importing Scottish concepts’, citing Ward v Van der Loeff [1924] AC 653, 669 as an example. Paterson, 
‘Scottish Lords of Appeal’ (n 11) 246 also commented that Lord Dunedin was among those Scots who ‘stand out 
as tireless protectors of their indigenous law from conscious or unconscious assimilation with English Law’. 
37 Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade (n 32), 448-449. 
38 Ibid, 450. 
39 Notice that in Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade (n 32) 448, Lord 
Dunedin refers to the passage by Lord Brougham from Earl of Mansfield mentioned above at Fn 33.  
40 Vine Appellant v National Dock Labour Board [1957] AC 488 (HL). 
41 Ibid, 497. 
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discretion should not be exercised save for good reason. Viscount Kilmuir LC further referred 
to what he called the ‘Scottish tests’ set out by Lord Dunedin which he found useful and which 
he reproduced in his judgment.42  
Another 33 years later, in the House of Lords decision in In Re F,43 in an English appeal, 
we encounter a similar (indirect) reference to Lord Dunedin’s tests, this time by Lord Goff 
(who had played a crucial role in the context of forum non conveniens)44 who mentioned both, 
Russian Commercial and Vine Appellant, noting obiter that in the latter decision 
 
Viscount Kilmuir L.C. found this Scottish approach to be helpful; and indeed there is authority 
in the English cases that a declaration will not be granted where the question under consideration 
is not a real question, nor where the person seeking the declaration has no real interest in it, nor 
where the declaration is sought without proper argument...45  
 
Importantly, in this passage Lord Goff suggests that there is English authority that is 
essentially in line with the Scottish approach, though he does not cite any of the cases. 
Nonetheless, by indicating that there is English authority he may well have prepared the ground 
for the first instance English decision in Wyko Group Plc and Others v Cooper Roller Bearings 
Co Ltd,46 where Lord Dunedin’s tests were eventually applied. After having outlined legislation 
providing courts with the power to grant declaratory relief, Ferris J stated that: 
 
This has been the rule since 1883, albeit that its wording has been altered from time to time. It 
has been commented upon in a number of authorities to some of which I find it desirable to refer. 
In Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. British Bank for Foreign Trade [1921] 2 A.C. 
438 at page 448 Lord Dunedin summarised the Scottish rule as follows: The question must be a 
real and not a theoretical question: the person raising it must have a real interest to raise it; he 
must be able to secure a proper contradictor, that is to say, some one presently existing who has 
a true interest to oppose the declaration sought. He proceeded to apply this rule to the case before 
the House, which was an English case.47  
 
Ferris J then proceeded to ascertain whether the requirements set out by Dunedin were 
present in the case and concluded that the first and third of Lord Dunedin’s conditions were 
not satisfied, therefore dismissing the appeal. In other words, Ferris J regarded Russian 
Commercial, including Lord Dunedin’s tests, as authority for English law, even though he 
explicitly spoke of a ‘Scottish rule’. The parties also relied upon Re F, mentioned above, and 
Ferris J pointed out that ‘In that case Lord Goff, at page 82, referred with evident approval to 
the passage which I have cited from Lord Dunedin’s speech in the Russian Bank case’,48 almost 
as if to justify his own decision to apply Lord Dunedin’s tests. Thus, at this point, Lord 
Dunedin’s tests became part of English law and were henceforth treated as authoritative and 
applied in later cases, including by the Court of Appeal.49  
To summarise, declaratory actions represent an interesting example where the circulation of 
Scottish legal ideas was sequential, for they entered south of the border at successive stages, 
 
42 Ibid, 500.  
43 In Re F [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL). 
44 See above at Fn 26 the quote by Lord Bingham.  
45 In Re F (n 43), 82. 
46 Wyko Group Plc and Others v Cooper Roller Bearings Co Ltd [1996] FSR 126. 
47 Ibid, 132. 
48 Ibid, 133-134. 
49 Point Solutions Limited v Focus Business Solutions Limited and another [2007] EWCA Civ 14 [19]. The court 
rejected the appeal against Point Solutions Limited v Focus Business Solutions Limited, Focus Solutions Group 
Plc [2005] EWHC 3096 (Ch) [67]-[68]. See further, HM (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2011] EWCA Civ 1536. 
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with each possibly facilitating or inviting the other. Furthermore, at both stages of the process, 
the adoption of the ideas was phased. While the introduction into English law of a general 
power to give declaratory judgments took about 40 years, Lord Dunedin’s tests as to when to 
provide a declaratory order also took some 75 years before they were adopted in English law. 
Lord Dunedin’s seed planted in 1921 needed time to grow. Thus, temporality matters for it 
allows us to see the continuity of communication as well as the interconnectedness of events 
across time and space. At the same time, declaratory actions are also a good example where 
both the legislature and the courts (including judicial figures on both sides of the border) have 
played a significant part and where, unlike in other cases we will come across later, the Scottish 
provenance of the legal idea was never hidden.  
 
 
B. Exploring the Spatial Dimensions  
 
The temporal aspect aside, we should also pay close attention to the spatial dimension of 
communication practices.50 There are, of course, different ways of conceptualising space, and 
to a certain extent, spatiality has always played a role in the scholarly debate involving legal 
transplants, the idea being that a legal idea is transplanted from one place to another. However, 
the point I would like to stress here is that it is essential not merely to examine the immediate 
geographical space/relationship between Scotland and England but to also pay attention to the 
broader spatial dimension. By doing so we are able to see facets of their relationship and the 
communication practices that are not always immediately obvious, though no less significant. 
We will, for instance, see that there are areas of the law where Scottish legal ideas have 
circulated south of the border not directly but via another jurisdiction, and thus indirectly.  
 
(i) The communication takes place via another jurisdiction 
 
A good example of both a direct and, more importantly, indirect communication between the 
Scottish and the English legal traditions (in this case, via New Zealand), is the process that led 
to the introduction of the family provision legislation in England.51 This legislation enables 
certain persons who have not been adequately provided for in a will or on intestacy, to bring a 
claim for reasonable financial provision from a deceased person’s estate. The process that led 
to the introduction of the legislation in England involved various stages during which Scots 
law played a key role, at different times and in different geographical places, even though, 
technically speaking, the Scottish approach to testamentary freedom and family protection was 
never adopted in England.   
First, together with other jurisdictions, Scots law and its system of fixed shares in the form 
of legal rights for the protection of the spouse and the children of the deceased,52 presented an 
incentive for introducing changes into English law and thus for limiting testamentary 
freedom.53 In addition, Scots law also offered a model which was directly drawn upon on 
several occasions during the English legislative process,54 even though ultimately the New 
 
50 A Kedar, ‘Expanding Legal Geographies. A Call for a Critical Comparative Approach’, in I Braverman, N 
Blomley, D Delaney and A Kedar (eds), The Expanding Spaces of Law. A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford 
University Press 2014) 95, who advocates for a greater attention to spatiality in comparative law. 
51 Now enshrined in the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. 
52 For a more detailed account, see KGC Reid, ‘Legal Rights in Scotland’, in KGC Reid, MJ de Waal, and R 
Zimmermann (eds), Comparative Succession Law: Family Protection, vol III (OUP 2020 forthcoming). 
53 J Finch, J Mason, J Masson, L Wallis and L Hayes, Wills Inheritance and Families (Clarendon Press 1996) 25. 
54 For an account of the history of the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938, and the role of Scots law, see J 
Dainow, ‘Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England’ (1940) 25 Cornell Law Review 337, 344 ff. For a 
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Zealand model, which provides courts with discretionary powers to provide for certain 
persons,55 prevailed. However, as we will see, that model too had come into close contact with 
the Scottish approach to testamentary freedom and the protection of the interests of the family.   
As Joseph Dainow has shown, at the start of the 20th century, it was clear in England that 
family members did not enjoy sufficient protection and that the deceased’s testamentary 
freedom was conceived of as being too wide.56 Nonetheless, twenty years had to pass before a 
Bill was first submitted to Parliament aimed at protecting certain family members from 
disinheritance, and another ten years before legislation was finally passed in 1938.57 In 1928 
Viscount Astor presented a motion to the House of Lords, and a first Bill. The clear impetus 
behind his ‘Wills and Intestacies (Family Maintenance) Bill’ was both a growing number of 
cases in which some family members went empty handed, but also an increasing awareness, it 
seems, that elsewhere, that is to say in Scotland, but also other parts of the Empire, things 
worked rather differently. What is more, the Astor Bill combined a fixed statutory share that 
was based on Scots law with the New Zealand model mentioned earlier. Although Viscount 
Astor’s Bill would appear to have obtained wide newspaper publicity, and the general reaction 
was favourable,58 it remained unsuccessful, and the same fate awaited Astor’s second Bill.  
Another Bill (the First Rathbone Bill) was presented in 1930 which also took inspiration 
from Scotland as well as New Zealand.59 It proposed a priority payment and an income for the 
surviving spouse, as well as an income for the children that the court had the power to annul in 
certain circumstances.60 At this stage, a Joint Select Committee of both Houses was appointed 
to investigate the support for, and opposition to, the Bill, but again the Bill was not passed, and 
several others had to follow. Meanwhile, however, a clear preference had emerged among the 
Committee members for the New Zealand system and this preference prevailed until the end. 
Thus, at this point, the Scottish model no longer featured in the debate,61 except for the fact 
that when the final Bill was passed in 1938 ‘attempts were made to sidetrack this Bill by 
reiterating preference for a fixed statutory share on the Scottish lines.’62  
Although, in the end, the Scottish approach to testamentary freedom and family protection 
did not prevail in England, Scots law provided both an incentive as well as a model for several 
Bills, clearly shaping the debate in this area. Additionally, and often less well known, the New 
Zealand model that prevailed in England had also come into close contact with Scottish legal 
ideas. In reconstructing the fascinating history of the New Zealand Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act 1900, Rosalind Atherton has shown that the initiative for the legislation in 
New Zealand, aimed primarily at limiting the husband’s testamentary freedom, came from a 
Scottish immigrant couple, the Stouts: Lady Anna Paterson Stout, a leader of the women’s 
movement, and her husband, Sir Robert Stout, first Premier and later Chief Justice of New 
 
detailed account of the various Bills, see R Oughton (ed), Tyler’s Family Provision (3rd edn, Butterworths 1997) 
3-19.  
55 Family Protection Act 1955. 
56 Dainow (n 54) 345.  
57 Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938. 
58 HL Deb 16 May 1928, vol 71, cols 38-61 where Lord Halden pointed out that the Scottish model was not 
without its problems: ‘although in theory it gave to the children a share of their father’s estate and provided for 
the wife by the ius relictae, in practice it was ineffective, for its operation was usually excluded by marriage 
settlements.’ The debate in the House of Lords attracted attention in academic circles. See (1928) 44 Law 
Quarterly Review 281-3. 
59 Dainow (n 54) 347-8. 
60 Ibid, 348 for further detail as to how close the Bill followed the Scottish model.   
61 Ibid, 349.  
62 Ibid, 356. 
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Zealand.63 More significantly, Sir Robert Stout64 introduced two Bills in New Zealand, one in 
1896,65 and the other in 1897,66 both of which were aimed at limiting ‘the power of disposition 
by will’67 by granting the surviving spouse and children a fixed share, as was the case in Scots 
law.68 However, both Bills met with opposition. In brief, when Stout resigned from Parliament 
in 1898, a further three Bills followed introduced by Robert McNab, but these looked rather 
different. Although the object of McNab’s Bills was the same, what they proposed was 
completely different, for they adopted a discretionary model rather than a model of fixed shares 
as in place in Scotland. As Atherton shows,69 this model was specifically designed by McNab 
to answer objections made to the more intrusive Scottish model that had informed Stout’s 
earlier Bills. Although it is difficult to establish a clear causal link, Atherton illustrates that 
there are facts from which to infer possible connections between Robert McNab and Robert 
Stout,70  including that both men had their legal backgrounds in Dunedin where the Scottish 
influence had been strong.  
To summarise, although in the end both New Zealand and England ended up rejecting the 
Scottish approach to testamentary freedom, and English law followed the New Zealand model, 
Scots law provided the stimulus for legal change in England both directly and, crucially for the 
purposes of this section, also indirectly.71 One could indeed argue that Stout’s initiative and his 
Bills, based on Scots law, paved the way – and provided an approach against which to react 
and develop a new model – for the legislation that was passed in New Zealand in 1900 and that 
would, as we saw, influence developments in England and elsewhere.  
Thus, communication practices are often more complex than one might expect and in order 
to realise that, we need to look beyond the immediate geographical space. To add to the 
complexity, a recent study suggests that it may well be the case that ‘the immediate source of 
legitim and jus relictae in Scotland lay in the English law of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.’72 In other words, in developing a system of fixed shares, Scots law is likely to have 
drawn on English sources. This confirms once more that the spatial dimension aside, 
investigating communication practices across time matters. It also shows that ideas have 
circulated in both directions and have sometimes even come full circle. This leads me to the 
next and last point concerning the spatial dimension of communication practices.  
 
(ii) The legal idea comes full circle 
 
63 R Atherton, ‘New Zealand’s Testator’s Family Maintenance Act of 1900 – The Stouts, The Women’s 
Movement and Political Compromise’ (1990) 7 Otago Law Review 202.  
64 Who came from the Shetlands where he went to school and qualified as a teacher before emigrating in 1963 to 
New Zealand at the age of 19.  
65 Limitation of the Power of Disposition by Will Bill 1896. 
66 Limitation of the Power of Disposition by Will Bill 1897. 
67 Atherton (n 63) 211.  
68 The 1896 Bill gave one third of all property to the widow, and one third to the child or children. The 1897 Bill 
reduced their shares to one quarter. In an earlier speech cited by Atherton (n 63) 207 Stout had mentioned both 
Scotland and France, but at the time France did not provide the surviving spouse with a fixed share. That is a 
recent change.   
69 Ibid, 216. 
70 Ibid, 213. 
71 Another, example of where Scottish legal ideas have circulated via another jurisdiction is mentioned by J 
Blackie, ‘Old and Foreign: History, Historiography and Comparative Law’ in L Farmer and S Veitch (eds), The 
State of Scots Law: Law and Government after the Devolution Settlement (Butterworths 2001) 75, 91 who 
examines the Scottish case Main v Leask 1910 SC 772 dealing with the duty of care in negligence in ‘pure 
economic loss’. After a PhD student at the University of London had given it prominence first in his PhD and 
then in an article (C Harvey, ‘Economic Losses and Negligence: The Search for Just Solution’ (1972) 50 Canadian 
Bar Review 58.) A resurrection followed in Australia where the High Court used this Canadian article and from 
there ‘it got back alive to the United Kingdom’, first in Scotland and then south of the border. 
72 Reid, ‘Legal Rights in Scotland’ (n 52) 5.  
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By paying attention to both time and space it is also sometimes possible to see that legal ideas 
circulate south and then come back up north again, or the other way around, as we have just 
seen with the example drawn from succession law. In other words, sometimes legal ideas can 
take a circular movement (i.e., come back full circle). An interesting example, which I can only 
deal with very briefly, is the doctrine of diminished responsibility. Although the exact origins 
of the doctrine in Scots law seem to be unclear, there is no doubt that the doctrine first circulated 
from Scotland to England when section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 was passed.73 The fact that 
English law has introduced a version of the Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility, is 
commonly acknowledged by legal scholars and judges, both north and south of the border.74 
What is perhaps less well known, however, and what renders this example so fascinating, is 
that 45 years after the introduction of the Homicide Act 1957, in Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 
2),75 the High Court of Justiciary directly drew on s 2 of the Homicide Act 1957. In other 
words, aspects of the English legislation which was originally inspired by Scots law were now 
used by the court in interpreting and developing Scots law.  
As James Chalmers has pointed out, ‘in a remarkable process of circularity, [the court] has 
imported the English definition [of abnormality of mind] into Scots law’, 76 drawing directly 
on s 2 of the (English) Homicide Act 1957. Again, greater awareness of the spatial dimension 
of the process can make us see here aspects that we would otherwise miss. What is more, as 
Chalmers laments, the High Court of Justiciary does not acknowledge explicitly that it has 
taken the definition from south of the border.77 In other words, the doctrine of diminished 
responsibility is an example not just of the circular movement of some legal ideas, but also of 
both open and hidden circulations, alerting us to the importance of paying attention to the 
language employed by legal actors, which represents the focus of the next part of this article.  
 
 
3. Paying Attention to Language  
 
Besides considering the spatio-temporal dimensions of communication practices, we should 
also pay attention to language and the labels employed in communication practices, by on the 
one hand, observing what is explicitly said, and, on the other hand, looking beyond what is 
immediately visible or displayed, and thus noticing what is absent.  
In this article, we have already come across several instances, where the Scottish origins of 
legal ideas were openly declared or acknowledged.78 It is important to pay attention to such 
instances and to inquire what lies behind such open manifestations and acknowledgments, as 
this can sometimes provide insight into the motivations that underpin existing communication 
practices, in our case between the Scottish and English legal traditions. At the same time, 
looking beyond the language employed is also crucial. This is so for a number of reasons. For 
instance, explicit claims that the law is the same on both sides of the border can conceal 
attempts to assimilate the law, whether in one direction or the other. Second, the absence of 
 
73 HC Debs 27 Nov 1956, col 318 (statement of the Attorney-General): ‘introduce into English law the Scottish 
doctrine of diminished responsibility’. See also HC Debs 15 Nov 1956, col 1153 (statement of the Home 
Secretary).  
74 It is acknowledged in Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (OUP 2015) 604, Fn 201. See also R v Spriggs [1958] 
1 QB 270, 274, per Lord Goddard CJ and more recently Regina v Smith [2001] 1 AC 146 (HL), 175 per Lord 
Clyde, and Lee Robert Foye v The Queen [2013] EWCA Crim 474, [16], [31].  
75 Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2) 2001 SLT 953. 
76 J Chalmers, ‘Abnormality and Anglicisation: First Thoughts on Galbraith v HM Advocate’ (2002) 6 Edinburgh 
Law Review 108, 114. 
77 Ibid, Fn 37. 
78 See above the example of the declaratory actions or forum non conveniens.  
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acknowledgement or referencing of the Scottish provenance is not necessarily indicative of a 
lack of communication. On the contrary, it may be a way of disguising the appropriation of 
Scottish legal ideas or suggest that they have been naturalised. Thus, paying attention to 
language and looking beyond it can reveal a range of techniques and practices employed by 
legal actors. These techniques can sometimes be expressions of political or ideological 
objectives,79 or simply be explained by considerations of mere convenience.  
In other words, even though circulation can happen in non-deliberate ways, what I am trying 
to argue here is that language can be indicative of practices that facilitate circulation, and that 
can be employed deliberately and instrumentally. In this section I will take a closer look at 
some of these techniques, as used by judges. In doing so I will explore both instances where 
the Scottish provenance of the legal ideas are openly discussed, and instances where they are 
either not immediately visible or perhaps purposefully hidden.  
 
A. Claiming That the Law Is the Same on Both Sides of the Border  
 
Sometimes courts tell us that the law is the same on both sides of the border. Now, this may 
well be true and there are many areas in which English and Scots law are essentially the same. 
For instance, a number of aspects of the English law of negligence have been derived from 
Scots law and vice versa.80 However, simply because courts say that the law is the same on 
both sides of the border, does not mean that this is the case. It is well known that especially in 
the past, claims that the law is the same has been a technique or practice commonly employed 
by the House of Lords to align Scots law with English law.81 However, it is argued here that 
the exact same technique or practice is also sometimes used to assimilate English law with 
Scots law. One can indeed find statements along the lines that English law is or should be the 
same as Scots law.82  
Pragmatic justifications aside,83 in the past, and more specifically between the second half 
of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, attempts to assimilate the law on both sides 
 
79 Rodger, ‘Thinking about Scots Law’ (n 5). On the role of ideology in the context of legal transplants, see 
especially M Graziadei, ‘Legal Transplants and the Frontier of Legal Knowledge’ (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law (2009) 723, 738. 
80 Lord Hope, ‘Scots law seen from south of the border’ (2012) Edinburgh Law Review 58, 66. See Home Office 
v Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004 (HL), where Lord Reid stated that ‘because the Scots and English laws of 
negligence are the same’. In Mitchell v Glasgow [2009] UKHL 11 [80] Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood 
said ‘[M]uch of England’s negligence law was forged in Scottish appeals’. And at [78] Lady Hale mentioned that 
‘This is but the latest in a long line of cases from Scotland which have played such an important part in shaping 
the law of negligence for the whole of the United Kingdom.’ As to the role of Donoghue v Stevenson, see HL 
MacQueen and WDH Sellar, ‘Negligence’ in KGC Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in 
Scotland (OUP 2000) vol 2, 517. Vicarious liability seems to be another area of continuous mutual interactions 
between England and Scotland and this is openly recognised in Lister and Others v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 
215 (HL) [39] where Lord Clyde acknowledged that: ‘This area of the law is one where Scotland and England 
have each drawn on the other’s jurisprudence.’ See also Wilsons v Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57 
(HL), 85 per Lord Maugham: ‘I am induced to do so only because the law in England on this topic is, in my 
opinion, the same as that in Scotland, and the case is one of great general importance.’ 
81 The technique is referred to by Gibb, Law From Over the Border (n 8); Brodie (n 8) 287, and DM Walker, 
‘Some Characteristics of Scots Law’ (1955) 18 Modern Law Review 321, 333 who speaks of a ‘trick’. See further 
Hope (n 80) 142. A good example in the context of occupier’s liability is the House of Lords decision on a Scottish 
appeal in Robert Addie and Sons (Collieries), Limited Appellants; v Dumbreck Respondent [1929] AC 35 where 
Scots law is brought in line with English law. As Elspeth Reid has put it in ‘The Impact of Institutions and 
Professions in Scotland’ in P Mitchell (ed) Comparative Studies in the Development of the Law of Torts in Europe 
(CUP 2012) 59, 65 ‘the speeches of the two Scots on the Committee, Lords Dunedin and Shaw, were central in 
assuring their brethren in the House of Lords that English and Scots law were already at one in this area. They 
were not.’  
82 A famous example is Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL). 
83 Rodger, ‘Thinking about Scots Law’ (n 5) 18. 
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of the border, and in particular to align Scots with English law, were sometimes motivated by 
ambitious political reasons, more specifically the desire to create a ‘law of the Empire’ or ‘one 
law for Britain’.84 This explanation, of course, does not explain more contemporary instances 
of assimilation, though Lady Hale’s recent lecture to the Scottish Law Society on the 
‘Contribution of Scottish Cases to the Developing United Kingdom Law’ could suggest that 
there is perhaps a sense among members of the Supreme Court that a ‘law of the UK’ is 
developing that is built not just by legislative interventions but also case law.85 This brings me 
to the next point.  
In some instances, uniformity on both sides of the border, and thus consistent interpretation, 
is desirable and hence declared or assumed because the area is one in which there is UK 
legislation in place.86 There are plenty of such examples, e.g. in areas such as employment law, 
company law, tax law but also immigration law and social security law.87 But even outside the 
areas characterised by UK legislation, uniformity can be desirable.88 Here I would like to draw 
attention to the recent Supreme Court decision in Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars.89 The 
case deals with the valuation for non-domestic rates, that is tax on individual units of property, 
known in England as hereditaments. Where a hereditament is wholly or partly occupied, rates 
are payable by the party who is in rateable occupation. In Woolway it was necessary to decide 
whether distinct spaces were under common occupation. 
Without being able to enter into too much detail, what is vital is that the Supreme Court 
expressly derived the principles which decided the case directly from Scottish case law, and 
that it used them to overturn the leading English Court of Appeal decision in Gilbert v 
Hickingbottom & Sons Ltd decided back in 1956.90 Even more important for the purposes of 
the argument developed in this section is that Lord Sumption, who gave the leading judgment 
in Woolway, having outlined the principles which he derived from Scottish case law, argued 
that:  
 
84 Ibid, 20-21; Evans-Jones, ‘Roman law in Scotland’ (n 12) 614 ff. See also E Reid ‘The Impact of Institutions’ 
(n 81) 68-9 and E Reid, ‘Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd (1985)’, in C Mitchell and P Mitchell (eds), 
Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort (Hart Publishing 2010) 251. 
85 Lady Hale, ‘The Contribution of Scottish Cases’ (n 9), who put it in the following terms: ‘We are also very 
conscious, in the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, of the contribution made by Scottish cases, and also by 
Scottish lawyers, to the development of United Kingdom law’. See Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS 
Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251, [21] where Auld LJ built upon Counsel for the plaintiff’s use of Scottish academic 
literature and Scots case law and agreed that the only ‘United Kingdom authority for the proposition that an 
employer may be vicariously liable for breach of statutory duty’ was the Scottish Court of Session case Nicol v 
National Coal Board (1952) 102 LJ 357. 
86 A good example here is the HL decision in Berkeley v Berkeley [1946] AC 555 (HL) dealing with the question 
of the meaning of the term ‘provision’ in the Finance Act 1941 s 25, sub-s. I, which applies to the whole of the 
UK. References to similar presumptions can be found also in Winter v IRC (Appeal in In re Sutherland, Decd) 
[1963] AC 235 (HL) dealing with the meaning of ‘contingent liability’. Again, the interpretation given in Scots 
law was applied to an English appeal. The case played a central role in the decision of the Supreme Court in Re 
Nortel GmbH or Bloom v Pensions Regulator (In re Sutherland, decd) [2014] AC 209, [81] concerning the 
pension context.  
87 See Lady Hale’s lecture ‘What is the United Kingdom Supreme Court for?’, Macfadyen Lecture 2019, 
Edinburgh, 28 March 2019, 12. 
88 See Viscount Finlay in Cantiere San Rocco SA v Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co Ltd [1924] AC 226 
(HL) 244 who observed: ‘It would be unfortunate that in matters of this kind, which may, as here, affect foreigners, 
the results should be different in the two parts of Great Britain.’ 
89 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] UKSC 53. 
90 Gilbert v Hickingbottom & Sons Ltd [1956] 2 QB 40 (CA). What is fascinating here is that although Lord 
Denning had preferred the geographical test, he felt bound to dismiss the appeal because in his view the application 
of the test was a question of fact. He argued that if the Lands Tribunal thought that it was one hereditament, they 
must have had their reasons. While Lord Sumption was ‘surprised’ by this conclusion [14] Lord Neuberger [58] 
described Denning’s choice ‘as an abdication of an appellate judge’s responsibility.’ Thus, here we have another 
example of a delayed adoption.  
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One would not expect the law to be any different when the identical questions arise for decision 
in England. However, confusion has been caused by the leading English case, which is the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Gilbert v S Hickinbottom & Sons Ltd [1956] 2 QB 40.91 
 
Here Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath and Lord Toulson agreed) clearly wanted 
to bring English law in line with Scots law. However, Lord Sumption did not explain why one 
would not expect the law to be different, which is significant because this is not an instance 
where there is UK legislation in place. However, the other members of the court felt just the 
same. Lord Gill, formerly Lord President of the Court of Session who was sitting as a 
temporary judge (who has a wealth of experience in this area of the law and who may well 
have played a role behind the scenes), put things in a slightly different manner. In his view: 
 
Although the law of valuation for rating is governed in Scotland by different legislation, the 
essential point is identical in both jurisdictions. …in my view, there is no reason why the two 
jurisdictions should diverge on the principles of the matter. On the contrary, it is desirable that 
they should coincide.92  
 
To say that there is no reason why the law should diverge is of course somewhat different 
from saying that one would not expect it to be different, for it suggests that it could be 
different, though Lord Gill clearly found that undesirable. By contrast, using normative 
language, Lord Neuberger put it in yet another way: 
 
I entirely agree that there should be no difference of approach between Scottish and English law 
on the issue raised on this appeal.93 (emphasis added) 
 
Irrespective of these differences in language, in Woolway the Supreme Court agreed that 
uniformity of approach north and south of the border was desirable and that Scots law offered 
a better approach. As a result, the law in England was aligned with the geographical test 
prevailing in Scotland. This was done by means of a practice that, as noted earlier, has often 
been used to align Scots with English law. Attention to language therefore provides useful 
insights into how communication takes place, but also the underlying motivations. 
Notice also that in this case, there was no attempt by members of the Supreme Court to hide 
or disguise that the law on both sides of the border had been different or that the new 
geographical test had Scottish origins. But this is not always the case. Sometimes, the 
circulation takes place in disguise, and this can be done purposefully. In fact, where judges 
state that the law ‘is’ the same, but this is not the case, the changes they are aiming to bring 
about may not be immediately obvious, and the circulation therefore be masked. Thus, looking 
beyond the language is also vital.  
 
B. Failing to Acknowledge Scottish Origins 
 
As mentioned earlier, the fact that there is no explicit reference to Scots law does not mean that 
there is no communication or circulation of Scottish legal ideas. Indeed, there are cases where 
Scottish legal ideas have circulated south of the border but where their origins have simply not 
been mentioned explicitly. A striking example of an instance where the Scottish provenance 
was not revealed (at first) is the area of penalty clauses, though as we will see in due course, 
 
91 Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP (n 89) [13]. 
92 Ibid, [34]. 
93 Ibid, [46].  
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the influence has recently been acknowledged, and in a prominent manner, both by the Court 
of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  
Here the foundations for the later adoption of Scottish legal ideas were laid by the 1905 
House of Lords decision in a Scottish appeal in Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd 
v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Catandeda.94 Perhaps unexpectedly, it was the judgment of one 
of the English judges, Lord Halsbury LC, which was to play a crucial role in facilitating the 
circulation of Scottish legal ideas. After having approved the position of Scots law on penalty 
clauses, and affirmed the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session, Lord Halsbury 
LC claimed that ‘[i]t is, I think, not denied now that the law is the same both in England and in 
Scotland’.95 Thus, here we have another example of the technique referred to above whereby 
the law on both sides of the border is declared to be the same. Whether Lord Halsbury LC’s 
claim was true is doubtful. David Ibbetson has shown not only that Scots law was different at 
least since 1869, but also that the conclusion that Lord Halsbury LC had reached was not one 
that for instance ‘the editors of the standard Common-law texts on contract at the time thought 
to incorporate into their works.’96  
It is difficult to know what motivated Lord Halsbury LC’s observation, especially since 
Clydebank Engineering was a Scottish appeal case and it was not necessary to reach a position 
on English law. The fact that his Lordship specified ‘now’, is most likely to be explained by 
the fact that in an earlier Scottish appeal to the House of Lords, decided in 1886, Lord 
Elphinstone v Monkland Iron and Coal Co,97 and in which his Lordship had also been part of 
the panel, Lord Fitzgerald had noted that: 
 
the law of Scotland, which we are now administering, seems in this respect to agree in principle 
with the law of the rest of the United Kingdom; or it would be more correct to say that the law 
of Scotland in this respect existed in full force and equitable effect whilst we were struggling 
against the hard and technical rules of our common law. I am not aware that there is any 
enactment in force in Scotland corresponding to our statute of 8 & 9 Wm. 3, c. 11, s. 8; nor does 
the Scotch law seem to have required such aid. We may take it, then, that by the law of Scotland 
the parties to any contract may fix the damages to result from a breach at a sum estimated as 
liquidated damages, or they may enforce the performance of the stipulations of the agreement by 
a penalty.98 
 
Again, why his Lordship felt the need to mention the fact that Scots law was in principle in 
agreement with the law in the rest of the UK, given that it was a Scottish appeal, is unclear. Be 
that as it may, while for Lord Fitzgerald in Lord Elphinstone, Scots law agreed in principle 
with the law in the rest of the UK, for Lord Halsbury LC in Clydebank Engineering it could 
not now be doubted that the law was the same. Hence, Lord Halsbury went a step further. 
Indeed, in his view the only difference between English and Scots law was the mode of 
administration of equity and law which was distinct in England. Whatever the motives behind 
his assertion, Lord Halsbury LC’s words seems to have prepared the ground for what was to 
happen ten years later in the English case Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & 
Motor Co Ltd.99  
In Dunlop counsel for the appellants cited both Scottish appeal cases, Clydebank and Lord 
Elphinstone. Importantly, both cases had been reported in the law report series of the Appeal 
 
94 Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Catandeda [1905] AC 6; (1904) 
7 F (HL) 77. 
95 Ibid, 9-10. 
96 Ibbetson (n 13) 279. 
97 Lord Elphinstone v Monkland Iron and Coal Co (1886) 11 App Cas 332. 
98 Ibid, 108. 
99 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 (HL). 
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Cases and were thus known and available to members of the English legal profession, which 
is a point I will return to in the conclusion. Lord Dunedin, whom we came across earlier in the 
context of declaratory orders, and who gave the leading judgment in Dunlop, relied primarily 
on three decisions: Clydebank, as well as two Privy Council decisions that had followed 
Clydebank within a short period of time: Webster v Bosanquet,100 an appeal from Ceylon, and 
Public Works Commissioner v Hills,101 an appeal from the Cape of Good Hope, in which Lord 
Dunedin was himself involved in. From these three cases Lord Dunedin drew propositions and 
developed a set of tests which became ‘the classic statement of the law of penalties’,102 and 
which would be influential in a wide range of cases in England and beyond.103 Thus, just as his 
Lordship did in Russian Commercial,104 dealing with declaratory orders, in Dunlop, Lord 
Dunedin formulated a set of tests drawn from case law, in this case on penalty clauses. Whether 
or not Lord Dunedin’s choice to distil propositions was deliberate – and it is likely that it was, 
for that was his style – one cannot but wonder whether this was a key reason why the Scottish 
legal ideas found their way into English law. Form matters and is perhaps not always paid 
sufficient attention to in comparative legal studies. 
What is noteworthy for the purposes of this section of the article is that Lord Dunedin did 
not mention that Clydebank was a Scottish appeal case, and neither did the other three judges.105 
Indeed, nobody questioned whether Clydebank should be used as authority for English law. 
Thus, although there is no express acknowledgement in Dunlop that both Clydebank and Lord 
Elphinstone were Scottish cases, Scottish legal ideas quietly circulated south of the border and 
were accepted as English law. Even so, Dunlop was clearly crucial in rendering the rules part 
of English law.  
But why did Lord Dunedin, or indeed any of the other judges, not point out that Clydebank 
and Elphinstone were Scottish appeal cases decided on the basis of Scots law? One might argue 
that their Lordships may have acted on the assumption that the law was the same in both 
jurisdictions. After all, that is what Lord Halsbury LC had stated in Clydebank. Also, none of 
the members of the panel in Dunlop had pointed out that the two Privy Council decisions came 
from Ceylon or the Cape of Good Hope. This may be explained by the fact that these were the 
heydays of the Empire so that the judges may not have felt the need to point out the provenance 
of the cases. Yet, this did not stop judges from mentioning the Scottish origins in other 
contemporary cases.106 What is more, one cannot help but notice that in the PC decision in 
Commissioner of Public Works v Hills, also referred to in Dunlop, and in which Lord Dunedin 
had delivered the Privy Council’s advice, his Lordship had explicitly stressed that Clydebank 
was indeed a Scottish and not an English case.107  
 
The House of Lords had occasion to review the law in the matter in the recent case of Clydebank 
Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda. It is perhaps 
worthy of remark, in view of certain observations of the learned Chief Justice in the Court below, 
that that was a Scotch case, that is to say, decided according to the rules of a system of law where 
 
100 Webster v Bosanquet [1912] AC 394 (PC).  
101 Commissioner of Public Works v Hills [1906] AC 368 (PC).  
102 These are the words of Arden LJ in Murray v Leisureplay Plc [2005] EWCA Civ 963, [34]. 
103 On Lord Dunedin’s influence in Australia, see J Eldrige, ‘The new law of penalties: mapping the terrain’ (2018) 
Journal of Business Law 637.  
104 Text after Fn 37.  
105 Lord Atkinson, Lord Parker of Waddington and Lord Parmoor. 
106 See, for instance, Cantiere San Rocco SA v Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co Ltd (n 88). 
107 Commissioner of Public Works v Hills (n 101) 375. Here note that P Mitchell, ‘The Privy Council and the 
Difficulty of Distance’ (2016) 36 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26, 30 has argued that in the Privy Council, 
judges ‘often went out of their way to signal that they were not rigidly applying English standards to the cases 
they heard’. 
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contract law is based directly on the civil law and where no complications in the matter of pleading 
had ever been introduced by the separation of common law and equity.  
 
So, it is not as if Lord Dunedin was unaware of the fact that Clydebank was a Scottish case 
or that Scots and English law differed on this point. However, the reference in Commissioner 
of Public Works to the Scottish origins is perhaps explained by the fact that Lord Dunedin was 
evidently responding to remarks by De Villiers CJ in the Court below, who had stressed that 
English law was not consistent with Roman-Dutch law.108 In other words, given that the 
decisions came from the Cape of Good Hope, Lord Dunedin may have felt the need to point 
out the Scottish origins of the appeal. David Ibbetson describes it therefore as ‘an example, 
perhaps, of mixed legal systems clubbing together’.109  
Irrespective of whether or not Lord Dunedin’s silence was strategic,110 the lack of mention 
of the Scottish origins was arguably a wise choice, for it is likely to have paved the way for 
Scots law to circulate south of the border. The omission of any reference to the provenance of 
the source of law may well have forestalled negative or adverse rejections.111 In this case, it 
may have allowed for Dunlop to be more easily accepted as authority for English law.112 As 
Lord Rodger has shown, in Donoghue v Stevenson, Lord Atkin had ‘prevailed upon Lord 
Macmillan to rewrite his speech in a way which would apply to English law also.’113  
However, the story did not end here. In fact, 90 years later, in 2005, in the Court of Appeal 
decision in Murray v Leisureplay Plc,114 Arden LJ unexpectedly, and one could even argue 
emphatically, credits Dunlop (as well as the two Scottish appeal cases, Clydebank and Lord 
Elphinstone) with having exerted a formative influence on the English law of penalty clauses. 
These were Arden LJ’s words: 
 
Interestingly, despite the influence of equity, English law has not always taken a consistent 
approach. As cases cited by the parties show, that the present position was only reached through 
the influence of Scots law and Commonwealth jurisprudence. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre v New 
Garage and Motor Company, Ltd is thus a remarkable example of the ability of English common 
law to absorb rules from other legal systems and in addition the influence of the Privy Council.115  
 
In her Ladyships opinion, Lord Dunedin’s speech in Dunlop ‘enunciated the law on 
penalties which is now embedded in our Common law’.116 Thus, we have here an instance 
where the influence of both, the Scottish appeal decision in Clydebank and the judgment of 
Lord Dunedin in the English appeal case Dunlop (as well as the two PC decisions), is explicitly 
acknowledged, though not at the time when Scots law had first entered the English legal 
system. This shows once more that attention to the temporal dimension is critical. The 
interesting question is of course, why did Arden LJ feel the need to point out the role and 
influence of Scots law? We can only speculate. What is noticeable is that Arden LJ was not 
 
108 Hills v Colonial Government (1904) 21 SCR 59, 79.  
109 Ibbetson (n 13) 280. 
110 Notice that Dunlop is not the only case not mentioning the Scottish pedigree. Clydebank is followed in Webster 
v Bosanquet (n 100) on appeal from Ceylon, and again its ‘Scottishness’ is not mentioned. 
111 Graziadei (n 1) 463. 
112 Evans-Jones, ‘Roman law in Scotland’ (n 12) 607 has argued that sometimes the ‘loan’ from Scotland had to 
be supressed to overcome certain obstacles. Later at page 629 he suggests that in Woolwich Building Society v 
IRC [1993] AC 70 Lord Goff ‘was possibly unwise to identify the source of his inspiration [civilian and Scots 
law] so clearly. It caused a vigorous reaction amongst English academics, who successfully argued that such a 
cause of action drawn from the civil law would be highly damaging if introduced into the common law.’  
113 A Rodger, ‘Lord Macmillan’s speech in Donoghue v Stevenson’ (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 236, 247. 
114 Murray v Leisureplay Plc (n 102) 963. 
115 Ibid, [30]. 
116 Ibid, [31]- [34]. 
 19 
only making a point about the relevance of Scots law, and of the two Privy Council decisions, 
but importantly also one about English law, and in particular about its capability to absorb rules 
from other legal systems.  
Another ten years later, the influence of Scots law in the area of penalty clauses was 
explicitly acknowledged also by the Supreme Court, in Cavendish Square Holdings BV v 
Makdessi; Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis,117 and this time by several members of the Court.118 This 
is not the place to engage in an analysis of the Supreme Court decision in Makdessi, and its 
consequences for the area of penalty clauses, including in Scotland. But it is curious that, Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption stated that ‘Lord Dunedin’s speech in the Dunlop case achieved 
the status of a quasi-statutory code in the subsequent case law,’ and that regrettably distinctions 
had developed which ‘originate in an over-literal reading of Lord Dunedin’s four tests and a 
tendency to treat them as almost immutable rules of general application which exhaust the 
field.’119 Thus, although arguably Lord Dunedin’s laying out of a set of propositions and tests 
may have, on the one hand, allowed the Scottish legal ideas to circulate more easily, in Lord 
Neuberger’s and Lord Sumption’s view the interpretation of Lord Dunedin’s speech had 
ultimately stifled the development of the common law. On an aside, in his judgment in 
Makdessi, Lord Hodge, undertook a historical survey of the Scottish rule, suggesting that there 
have been mutual influences as ‘Scots law has used English authorities, in its development.’120 
This would suggest that the circulation in this area of the law has not just been one way. Again, 
the plot is thickening, showing that the relationship is both reciprocal and complex, even if this 
is not always visible at first sight. 
Hence, the area of penalty clauses offers a salient example of how communication between 
Scotland and England can take place both openly and under the radar, but also of how stories 
of circulations and influences are sometimes told or not, and why. It also demonstrates that 
judges can resort to a range of techniques and confirms once more the importance of studying 
communication practices over time.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In this article I have tried to show that the relationship between Scotland and England is much 
richer and more dynamic than often conveyed by both Scottish and comparative legal literature. 
I have argued that this comes clearer into view if we study the relationship through the lens of 
communication practices, including how they unfold both across time and space, and pay 
careful attention to language. The article is therefore an invitation to extend comparative legal 
inquiry beyond discrete events and geographical spaces, and to study communication practices 
and the processes involved. This, then, allows us to garner a much more nuanced understanding 
of the relationships between legal traditions.  
The examples covered have shown that communication between north and south of the 
border is ongoing and has taken place across different areas of the law, ranging from criminal 
law to succession law, from contract law to tax law, and beyond. Quite often, communication 
stretches over long periods of time, as the circulation involves various steps and events that are 
frequently interconnected, before an idea may take a foothold. This process can be more or less 
visible, which is a common theme throughout this paper. What has also emerged is that 
communication may take place both directly and indirectly, and be initiated by different legal 
 
117 Cavendish Square Holdings BV v Makdessi; Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, [2016] AC 1172. 
118 Ibid, [37] (Lord Neuberger) and (Lord Sumption), and [131] (Lord Mance).  
119 Ibid, [31]. 
120 Ibid, [216], referring to Bell’s Principles of the Law of Scotland (10th edn, 1899) section 34 who refers to 
English cases.  
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actors, on both sides of the border, who sometimes avail themselves not only of channels but 
also techniques that can facilitate the circulation of legal ideas in both directions. In many of 
the examples in this article, the circulation is purposefully initiated, for instance where a seed 
is planted, or the law is claimed to be the same on both sides of the border, or the Scottish roots 
of the legal idea is disguised. This, as we have seen, may be driven by a number of motives, 
including dissatisfaction with the state of the law,121 but also political and ideological reasons, 
as well as considerations of mere convenience or pragmatism.122  
All this has, of course, implications for how we perceive both English and Scots law. On 
the one hand, the analysis shows that English law is permeable to ideas from Scotland,123 
including Civil law ideas,124 and perhaps more than often assumed and acknowledged. 
Moreover, although the penalty clauses example shows that English courts have been equally 
open to influences from other parts of the former British Empire, the relationship with Scotland 
is clearly different and distinctive. Aside from proximity, economic and political affinity, and 
the institutional factors referred to above,125 there are many areas where the law is effectively 
the same or where assimilation is desirable due, for instance, to the existence of UK legislation. 
Another significant factor would seem to be the availability and accessibility of source 
material. It must be remembered that appeal cases from Scotland are often reported in the law 
report series of the Appeal Cases. Whilst the publication of the official English law reports 
‘made possession of those reports easy to those who lived in Scotland’,126 and therefore 
allowed for English legal ideas to circulate north of the border, the same reports have made the 
Scottish appeal cases available to the English legal profession. It is noticeable in this regard 
that south of the Tweed, the Scottish appeals to the House of Lords, or now to the Supreme 
Court, are usually referred to by citing the English and not the Scottish reports. This may 
contribute to explaining why the Scottish origins of some of these decisions, especially those 
that have become leading cases in their own spheres, are sometimes no longer mentioned.127 
Thus, there are particular reasons why English legal actors draw on legal ideas from Scotland 
rather than from other jurisdictions. In fact, a further aspect that has emerged is that when Scots 
law is used to promote change in the law in England, it is not usually regarded as ‘foreign’, 
even when, as was the case in the penalty clauses example, the ‘Scottishness’ of the tests was 
explicitly referred to.128  
 
121 See also Evans-Jones, ‘Roman law in Scotland’ (n 12) 629. 
122 An example of such pragmatism may be Gow v Grant [2012] UKSC 29, [44]-[56] where in a long obiter 
dictum Lady Hale points out five lessons that can be learned from the Scottish experience. 
123 The receptiveness to legal ideas from ‘other legal systems’ has been, however, acknowledged by members of 
the judiciary. See the words by Arden LJ in Murray [30] cited above at n 115. See also Lord Bingham, ‘The 
Future of the Common Law’, in T Bingham (ed), The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches (OUP 
2000) 383 ‘the common law has over the centuries provided a shameless snapper-up of well-considered trifles of 
foreign law.’  
124 We have indeed seen that some of the ideas coming from north of the border, are civilian in origin e.g. 
declaratory actions. See also Evans-Jones, ‘Roman law in Scotland’ (n 12) 629 and, especially, Lord Rodger, 
‘“Say Not the Struggle Naught Availeth”: The Costs and Benefits of Mixed Legal Systems’ (2003) 78 Tulane 
Law Review 419, 430 where he remarked that ‘I suspect that the reality is that common law systems are now 
more permeable to civil law influences than civil law systems are to influences from the common law…. That 
may mean that the gap between mixed systems and common law systems will narrow over the coming decades.’ 
125 See above at Fn 10 and 11. 
126 Lord Dunedin, ‘Preface’, in JL Wark (ed), Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Vol 1 (W Green & Son 
1926) vi.  
127 A very good example is, again, Donoghue v Stevenson (n 82), which has been referred to as ‘the most famous 
case in English law of tort’, by N McBride and R Bagshaw, Tort Law (3rd edn, Longman 2008) 72. Junior 
Books v Veitchi [1983] 1 AC 520 is also often discussed in the context of English tort cases on economic loss and 
without reference to its Scottish origins. 
128 See above text at Fnn 42 and 47.  
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At the same time, and equally importantly, the examples also tell us something about Scots 
law. The image that emerges here is not one of a legal system that is merely receptive of foreign 
legal ideas, as the prevailing narrative would have us believe, but that of a legal system which 
also generates ideas capable of stimulating and shaping developments elsewhere, i.e. a place 
through and from which legal ideas circulate in all sorts of directions, sometimes to come full 
circle again. This finding, I believe, warrants further reflection and attention. Although the 
concept of ‘mixed legal systems’ has ignited assumptions that have made us perhaps blind to 
certain aspects of them,129 and their relationships with other legal traditions, this article shows 
that they have the ability to enter into a dialogue with other legal traditions in ways that can 











129 Lord Rodger, ‘Say Not the Struggle’ (n 123) 422 argued that ‘those who place importance on its mixed nature 
tend to define our legal system by its past!’.  
